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Vol. 69 FALL, 1964 No. 1
THE MYTH OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ANTITRUST
LAW AND LABOR LAW IN THE APPLICATION OF
ANTITRUST LAW TO UNION ACTIVITY
BY H. STEPHEN FRANK*
The thesis of this Article may be expressed as follows: Although a con-
flict in the abstract theories of the antitrust law and labor law may exist,
there should be no doctrinal difficulty in the legal application of the antitrust
laws to labor union activity.
The Supreme Court has expressed this conflict as follows:
The result of all this is that we have two declared congressional
policies which it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one
seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to
preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions
through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine
here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies
to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.'
In applying the antitrust laws to labor union activities, three principles
exist which remove the necessity of any analysis of the purported conflict
between antitrust law and labor law.
1. Labor law and not antitrust law applies to union activities which
are separate and apart from a management violation of the antitrust laws.
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups . . . the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end
of which the particular union activities are the means.2
2. The antitrust laws apply to union activities which evidence union
participation in a management violation of the antitrust laws.
* B.A., 1952, Boston University; LL.B., 1955, Cornell University; LL.M., 1960,
New York University; attorney, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.; member,
New York and District of Columbia bars. (The views expressed herein are those of the
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1. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806
(1944).
2. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1940).
2 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
There is, however, one line which we can draw with assurance that
we follow the congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared
the concentrated power of business organizations to dominate markets
and prices. It intended to outlaw business monopolies. A business
monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such par-
ticipation is a violation of the [Sherman] Act.3
3. In applying the antitrust laws to union activities, the existence of a
labor dispute is immaterial, since it is labor's participation in a management
violation of the antitrust laws that is the issue.
The trial court found no evidence that the Union participated in
making the agreement. And, if it did, benefits to organized labor can-
not be utilized as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts out of the
antitrust fires.
4
While these principles may be glibly expressed in the current state of
antitrust-labor law, it is imperative that an examination be made of their
origin in order to understand their application to recent cases.
APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT TO UNION ACTIVITY BY JUDICIAL FIAT
The first Supreme Court decision to apply the Sherman Act 5 to labor
union activities was the landmark case of Loe-we v. Lawlor.6 Plaintiff, hat
manufacturers, had filed a treble damage complaint pursuant to section 7 of
the Sherman Act 7 wherein it was alleged that the defendant, United Hatters
3. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 811
(1944).
4. United States v. Women's Sportswear Assoc., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1948).
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958). Sections 1 and 2 of this act are as
follows:
section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall
make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
6. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
7. 26 Stat. 210 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). In 1890, section 7 read
as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person
or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this
act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Though section 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), it was super-
ceded by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952), and
was merely intended to have application to other antitrust causes. 51 CONG. REc. 9165
(1914).
ANTITRUST LAW AND UNION ACTIVITY
Union, had effected a nationwide consumer boycott of plaintiff's products in
order to force the plaintiffs to unionize their plants in violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. Although the lower court sustained defendants'
demurrer, the Supreme Court stating that "a case within the statute had been
set up" in the allegations of the complaint," held to the contrary. Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller, speaking for a unanimous court, vigorously applied the Sherman
Act to the labor union:
In our opinion, the combination described in the declaration is a
combination "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States," in the sense in which those words are used in the act, and
the action can be maintained accordingly. 9
He further stated:
And that conclusion rests on many judgments of this court, to
the effect that the act prohibits any combination whatever to secure
action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between
the States, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty of a trader to en-
gage in business.10
It is clear that the Supreme Court's application of the Sherman Act
was not a sharp reversal of the judicial expression that had been manifested
up to that time. Between the date the Sherman Act was passed and 1897,
lower federal courts had found unions in violation thereof twelve times, while
only one violation was found involving a business.1 ' The cases relied on by
the Supreme Court to support its application of the Sherman Act to union
activity were United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council'2 and
United States v. Debs13 which held that primary union activity was an inter-
ruption of interstate commerce and therefore a violation of the Sherman Act.
However, there has been a wealth of controversy as to whether these two
cases, which culminated in Loewe v. Lawlor, really reflected the intent of
Congress. 1 4 Although no definitive legislative history exists from which the
intent of Congress can clearly be shown, it is clear that the applicability of
the Sherman Act to labor unions is by judicial fiat.15
8. 208 U.S. at 309.
9. Id. at 292.
10. Id. at 293.
11. See BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT 3 (1930), and cases cited therein.
12. 54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), aff'd, 57 Fed. 85 (5th Cir. 1893).
13. 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
14. BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 3-54; MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE
LAW (1925) ; Terbough, The Application of the Sherman Act to Trade Union Activities,
37 J. POL. ECON. 203 (1929) ; Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes, 39 COLUM.
L. REV. 1283 (1939) and 40 COLUM. L. REV. 14 (1940); Emery, Labor Organizations
and the Sherman Act, 20 J. POL. ECON. 599 (1912).
15. The Court said:
Nor can the act in question be held inapplicable because defendants were not
themselves engaged in interstate commerce. The act made no distinction between
1964]
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At the time Loewe v. Lawlor was decided, the then accepted view of
section 1 of the Sherman Act was that every contract or combination in re-
straint of trade fell within the purview of the act.' 6 Since the generally ac-
cepted doctrine of Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States,17 decided subsequent
to Loewe v. Lawlor, is that a "rule of reason" must be read into the statutory
mandate, it could be argued that the defendants' boycott of the hat manu-
facturers was a reasonable restraint of trade, and that if Loewe v. Lawlor
had been decided subsequent to Standard Oil, the Court would have so held.
This position seems untenable, however, in light of Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States,' which provided the impetus for
the firmly engrained rule that a group boycott is a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. 19 Whatever hindsight may be applied, Loewe v. Lawlor, never-
theless, is the foundation of the application of the Sherman Act to labor unions.
JUDICIAL NULLIFICATION OF A LABOR EXEMPTION CREATED BY CONGRESS
When Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914, an apparent attempt
was made to create an exemption for labor from the antitrust laws.20 Section
6 of the Clayton Act21 declares that "the labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article in commerce" and furthermore:
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid
the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for
classes. It provided that 'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade was illegal. The records of Congress show that several efforts were
made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the
operation of the act and that all these efforts failed, so that the act remained as
we have it before us.
208 U.S. at 301.
The Court's statement appears somewhat illusory. There was no congressional debate
on the application of the Sherman Act to labor after the act had been reported by the
Judiciary Committee in its final form. The discussion on labor occurred with reference
to another bill introduced by Senator Sherman reported from the Senate Finance Com-
mittee 21 CONG. REc. 96 (1889). All senators who spoke on the latter bill opposed its
application to labor and farmers' organizations with the exception of Senator Edmunds
21 CONG. REc. 2611 (1890). When the Finance Committee bill was referred to the
Judiciary Committee after an amendment was adopted by the Senate exempting labor
and farmers' organizations 21 CONG. REC. 2612 (1890), this bill was dropped, and the
present Sherman Act was adopted. Neither the Senate nor the House has recorded any
debate on the possibility of the Sherman Act applying to labor. See BERMAN, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 51; Boudin The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes, 39 COLUm. L. REv.
1283, 1285-93 (1939). Counsel for the union in Loewe v. Lawlor did not attempt to rebut
the statement of management counsel that Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply
to labor. BERMAN, supra at 86.
16. The classic exposition of this view is the opinion in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897).
17. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
18. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
19. See Fashion Originators Guild of Am. Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
20. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1958).
21. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
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the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organi-
zation or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal com-
binations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.2
Supplementing that provision, section 2023 bars the issuance of injunctions
by federal courts which would prohibit such activities as strikes, boycotts
or picketing-
in any case between an employer and employees, or between em-
ployers and employees or between employers, or between persons
employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing
out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment....
Section 20 concludes with the broad language: "[N]or shall any of the acts
specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law
of the United States."
Soon after the passage of the Clayton Act, it became evident that the
Supreme Court was not going to apply the labor exemption granted therein
very liberally. In both Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering24 and Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n,25 the aforementioned ex-
emption was considerably narrowed. In Duplex, the defendant-craft union and
its affiliates boycotted plaintiff's customers in an attempt to induce them not
to purchase printing presses made by the plaintiff, who operated a non-union
shop. The Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the bill
for an injunction, held that section 6 applied to lawful union activity and was
not intended to legalize any unlawful union activity of the type that was
present in the case at bar. 26 Furthermore, the exemption created by section 20
could not be invoked by members of the union who were not immediate parties
to the dispute, since this section applied only to protect "parties standing in
proximate relation to the controversy such as particularly described.
'27 The
net effect of Duplex was that section 20 did not immunize the secondary
boycott from injunction.
The Bedford case, differing from Duplex only in that the secondary
boycott by employees of building contractors was directed against building
stone producers who had ceased to recognize the union in the stone-cutting
22. This section would nullify judicial attempts at making a labor union a common
law conspiracy. See Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 202 Fed. 512 (N.D. W. Va.
1912), rev'd, 214 Fed. 685 (4th Cir. 1914), rev'd, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
23. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
24. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
25. 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
26. 254 U.S. at 469.
27. Id. at 471.
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field, also held that the secondary boycott on the part of the stone-cutters
was enjoinable. The Court stated:
Respondents' chief contention is that "their sole and only pur-
pose . . . was to unionize the cutters and carvers of stone at the
quarries." And it may be conceded that this was the ultimate end
in view. But how was that end to be effected? The evidence shows
indubitably that it was by an attack upon the use of the product in
other states to which it had been and was being shipped, with the in-
tent and purpose of bringing about the loss or serious reduction of
petitioners' interstate business, and thereby forcing compliance with
the demands of the unions. And, since these strikes were directed
against the use of petitioners' product in other states, with the plain
design of suppressing or narrowing the interstate market, it is no
answer to say that the ultimate object to be accomplished was to
bring about a change of conduct on the part of petitioners in respect
to the employment of union members in Indiana. A restraint of inter-
state commerce cannot be justified by the fact that the ultimate object
of the participants was to secure an ulterior benefit which they might
have been at liberty to pursue by means not involving such restraint.28
Thus, after the Supreme Court had decided these two cases, it could
be stated, as one commentator has, that "the Clayton Act was not a stale-
mate for unions. It was an unmitigated disaster. ' 29 Furthermore, although
only the Government was able to secure an injunction against labor unions
prior to the passage of the Clayton Act,30 section 16 of the Clayton Act,
31
as interpreted by the Court, now permitted employers to secure this relief.
In addition to Duplex and Bedford, the first 32 and second' 3 Coronado Coal
Co. v. UMW cases drove another wedge into the abortive exemption of labor
unions from the antitrust laws created by the Clayton Act. In these cases,
the plaintiffs, who owned coal mines, sought to recover treble damages under
section 734 of the Sherman Act against the defendant union which had de-
stroyed plaintiffs' mining property during a strike. When the case first reached
the Supreme Court, it was held that the evidence was not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction under section 7, since the union activity was local. Therefore,
the Court held that the jury could not properly find that defendant's actions
were committed in a conspiracy to restrain or monopolize interstate com-
28. 274 U.S. at 47.
29. Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 33 (1963).
30. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1948). Private parties had a right of action
for treble damages.
31. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
32. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
33. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
34. See note 7 supra, for the history of section 7.
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merce.3 5 On retrial of the case, evidence was introduced to show that the
union's purpose was to stop production of non-union coal and prevent its
shipment to other states, because it reduced the price of coal and adversely
affected union wages. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, finding this to be an "illegal
purpose," said that defendant's action was a violation of the Sherman Act.
He stated :
The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in
interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manu-
facture or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction
to that commerce. But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing
the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control
the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price
of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the
Anti-Trust Act .... We think there was substantial evidence to show
that the purpose of the destruction of the mines was to stop the pro-
duction of non-union coal and prevent its shipment to markets of
other States than Arkansas, where it would by competition tend to
reduce the price of the commodity and affect injuriously the main-
tenance of wages for union labor in competing mines, and that the
direction by the District Judge to return a verdict for the defendants
other than the International Union was erroneous.
36
In the subsequent case of Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of Am., 3 7 a district court, citing the second Coronado case for the
proposition that it is the intent to stop production for the purpose of control-
ling interstate commerce and not the methods used which makes the union's
action unlawful, 38 further extended the "illegal purpose" rule to encompass
even a peaceful strike.
Thus, before 1930 the judiciary had applied the Sherman Act to labor
union activity involving three patterns of conduct: secondary boycotts, illegal
purpose, 39 and interruption of interstate commerce.
40
35. 259 U.S. at 412-13.
36. 268 U.S. at 310.
37. 35 F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
38. 35 F.2d at 208.
39. The second Coronado case has some vitality today. See ATT'y GEN. NAT'L
COMM. ANTITRUST REP. (1955), which states that "commercial restraints by unions may
be vulnerable to antitrust proceedings: (1) Where the union engages in fraud or violence
and intends or achieves some direct commercial restraint. Id. at 299. See also
OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 47 (2d ed. 1959).
In this connection it is also interesting to note that the minority decision in Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), to be discussed infra, would make any strike
illegal if it prevented the transportation of the intended products in interstate commerce.
40. See United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D.
La. 1893); United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894) ; United States
v. Ry. Employees Dep't, 283 Fed. 479 (N.D. Ill. 1922); Williams v. United States, 295
Fed. 302 (5th Cir. 1923) ; Western Union Tel. v. Local 134, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
1964]
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Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader :41 A JUDICIAL DEPARTURE
In 1940, the Apex Court departed from the previous judicial trend of
using the Sherman Act to police union activity according to the ad hoc judicial
interpretations of unlawful labor practices.
In this case, plaintiff-corporation, engaged in the manufacture of hosiery,
brought a treble damage action pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act
4 2
in the District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania against the defendant-labor
union. Plaintiff, employing about 2500 persons and operating a non-union
shop, refused to accede to the defendant's demands for a closed shop. Mem-
bers of the union from other factories, together with eight employees of
plaintiff, staged a "sit down" strike, which resulted in the taking over of the
plant by the union. Although the trial court ruled for the plaintiff, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed43 on the grounds that the effect on
interstate commerce was insubstantial and the evidence failed to indicate an
intent on the part of defendant to restrain interstate commerce. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the court of appeals, could have relied on the first Coronado
case and found that the union activities were local in effect or on the second
Coronado case, and found that the evidence failed to indicate an illegal pur-
pose on the part of the union. Instead, Mr. Justice Stone, embarking on the
first judicial attempt to give meaningful guidelines to anti-trust litigation
involving labor unions, said that the union activity was not violative of the
Sherman Act unless it intended to restrain commercial competition.
A second significant circumstance is that the Court has never applied
the Sherman Act in any case, whether or not involving labor organi-
zations or activities, unless the Court was of the opinion that there
was some form of restraint upon commercial competition in the
marketing of goods or services and finally this Court has refused to
apply the Sherman Act in cases like the present in which local strikes
conducted by illegal means in a production industry prevented inter-
state shipment of substantial amounts of the product but in which it
was not shown that the restrictions on shipments had operated to re-
strain commercial competition in some substantial way.
44
2 F.2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 1924) ; Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. District 9, Int'l Ass'n of Ma-
chinists, 252 Fed. 597 (E.D. Mo. 1918).
41. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). Although this case was decided after the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958), it
did not involve its application.
42. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). The act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable at-
torney's fee.
43. 108 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1939).
44. 310 U.S. at 495-96.
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He further stated that union activity would only violate the Sherman Act if
it were directed at market control.
It will be observed that in each of these cases where the Act was
held applicable to labor unions, the activities affecting interstate com-
merce were directed at control of the market and were so widespread
as substantially to affect it. There was thus a suppression of competi-
tion in the market by methods which were deemed analogous to those
found to be violations in the non-labor cases.
45
Mr. Justice Stone then drew a distinction between restrictions placed by a
labor union on the labor market as opposed to price or market competition.
Strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers to
compel employers to yield to their demands, may restrict to some
extent the power of employers who are parties to the dispute to com-
pete in the market with those not subject to such demands. But under
the doctrine applied to non-labor cases, the mere fact of such restric-
tions on competition does not in itself bring the parties to the agree-
ment within the condemnation of the Sherman Act.... Furthermore,
successful union activity, as for example consummation of a wage
agreement with employers, may have some influence on price com-
petition by eliminating that part of such competition which is based
on differences in labor standards. Since, in order to render a labor
combination effective it must eliminate the competition from non-
union made goods . . . an elimination of price competition based on
differences in labor standards is the objective of any national organi-
zation. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be
the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sher-
man Act .... And in any case, the restraint here is, as we have seen,
of a different kind and has not been shown to have any actual or
intended effect on price or price competition.
46
It is also important to note that the Court said that violence alone does
not violate the Sherman Act.
47
United States v. Hutcheson48 and NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT49 CREATE A
TOTAL EXEMPTION FOR LABOR WHEN IT ACTS "ALONE"
The Apex decision was actually a reflection of the growing discontent of
Congress with the judiciary's application of the anti-trust laws to labor
unions.50 Congress in 1932 manifested this discontent by enacting the Norris-
45. Id. at 506. This distinction is criticized in Winter, Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J.
14, 43 (1963).
46. 310 U.S. at 503-04.
47. Id. at 491-92.
48. 312 U.S. 319 (1941).
49. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
50. 310 U.S. at 504 n.24.
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LaGuardia Act. The very fact that it was entitled the "Anti-Injunction Act".
demonstrated the legislative displeasure with judicial rulings in this area. 51
Furthermore, the preamble of the act is indicative of the congressional intent
to withdraw the court's power to formulate labor policy:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That no court
of the United States, as herein defined, shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict
conformity to the provisions of this Act; nor shall any such restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary
to the public policy declared in this Act.
52
There are two key sections to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Section 4
withdraws jurisdiction from the federal courts to issue injunctions "in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute."5 3 Section 13(c) defines
a labor dispute as follows:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, chang-
ing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regard-
less of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee.
5 4
The passage of the Wagner Act5 '5 in 1935 emphasizes the intent of Con-
gress to limit judicial legislation in the labor field by creating the NLRB
to formulate labor policy. Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection .... 56
Despite the intent of Congress, as manifested by this legislation, the
Department of Justice proceeded to bring a series of criminal indictments
51. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 73 (1960).
52. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
53. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
54. 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1958). The last phrase of 13 (c), "regard-
less of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee," directly contradicts the holdings in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443 (1921), and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n,
274 U.S. 37 (1927).
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1958).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
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against labor unions for violation of the Sherman Act.57 The Hutcheson5s
case was the first such prosecution to reach the Supreme Court. The officers
of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters were indicted under section 1 of
the Sherman Act for activities arising out of a jurisdictional dispute that
resulted in strikes, picketing and boycotting by the defendant-union against
Anheuser-Busch and other companies. The Carpenters union objected to the
Machinists union being permitted to perform certain installation and con-
struction work for Anheuser-Busch and other companies, and picketed An-
heuser-Busch and the premises of an adjoining tenant, the Gaylord Container
Corporation. The Carpenters union also refused to permit its members to
be employed by the building firms who were under contract to fulfill An-
heuser's expansion program. Furthermore, the defendant union circulated
letters suggesting that its friends and members refrain from purchasing
Anheuser-Busch beer. The district court sustained demurrers to the indict-
ment59 and the Supreme Court affirmed." Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the majority, handed down one of the landmark opinions in the antitrust-
labor field. Mr. Justice Stone concurred while Mr. Justice Roberts dissented
along with Chief Justice Hughes.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that the jurisdictional nature of the
strike was irrelevant under federal law, because the carpenters' actions in
striking, persuading others to strike, picketing and boycotting were all with-
in the range of activities exempted from the Sherman Act by section 20 of
the Clayton Act."' It was necessary that the learned Justice dispose of the
57. Thurman Arnold announced his policy against illegal labor union activities on
November 20, 1939. The following labor union activities were deemed illegal:
1. Unreasonable restraints designed to prevent the use of cheaper material,
improved equipment, or more efficient methods; 2. Unreasonable restraints de-
signed to compel the hiring of useless and unnecessary labor; 3. Unreasonable
restraints designed to enforce systems of graft and extortion; 4. Unreasonable
restraints designed to enforce illegally fixed prices; 5. Unreasonable restraints
designed to destroy an established and legitimate system of collective bargaining
(such as jurisdictional strikes, picketing or boycotting).
5 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1940).
58. For discussions of this case see Carey, The Apex and Hutcheson Cases, 25
MINN. L. REV. 915 (1941) ; Cavers, And What of the Apex Case Now?, 8 U. CHI. L.
REV. 516 (1941) ; Gregory, The New Sherinan-Clayton-Norris-La Guardia Act, 8 U. CHI.
L. REV. 503 (1941) ; Nathanson and Wirtz, The Hutcheson Case: Another View, 36
ILL. L. REV. 41 (1941) ; Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Hutcheson
Case, 36 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1941) ; Teller, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes and
Collective Bargaining-the Hutcheson Case, 40 MIcH. L. REV. 24 (1941) ; Tunks,
A New Federal Charter for Trade Unionism, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1941) ; Note, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 532 (1941); Note, 29 GEo. L.J. 770 (1941); Note, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
724 (1941) ; Note, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 827 (1941).
59. 32 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mo. 1940).
60. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). A direct appeal is permitted by the Criminal Appeals Act,
34 Stat. 1246 (1907), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1949). Direct appeals in civil cases
are by virtue of 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1948).




Duplex case,0 2 which held that the Clayton Act only legalized disputes be-
tween employers and their own immediate employees. In doing so, he reasoned
that Congress must have intended that the Norris-LaGuardia Act would re-
furbish the Clayton Act, to restore it to the meaning it should have had if
the Duplex case had properly interpreted congressional intent. In effect, he
said that the Clayton Act would prohibit injunctions in a peaceful labor
dispute between employees and employers, while the Norris-LaGuardia Act
would prohibit injunctions in a peaceful labor dispute regardless of whether
the relationship was that of employer-employee; therefore, these activities
are not indictable under the Sherman Act.
To be sure, Congress expressed this national policy and deter-
mined the bounds of a labor dispute in an act explicitly dealing with
the further withdrawal of injunctions in labor controversies. But to
argue, as it was urged before us, that the Duplex case still governs
for purposes of a criminal prosecution is to say that which on the
equity side of the court is allowable conduct may in a criminal pro-
ceeding become the road to prison. It would be strange indeed that
although neither the Government nor Anheuser-Busch could have
sought an injunction against the acts here challenged, the elaborate
efforts to prevent such conduct failed to prevent criminal liability
punishable with imprisonment and heavy fines. This is not the way to
read the will of Congress, particularly when expressed by a statute
which, as we have already indicated, is practically and historically
one of a series of enactments touching one of the most sensitive
national problems. Such legislation must not be read in a spirit of
mutilating narrowness.
6 3
The principal question, therefore, in the Hutcheson case was whether a
labor union could be prosecuted under the Sherman Act for restraining trade;
or did the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, which prohibit injunctions
against unions, so modify the Sherman Act as to protect labor from criminal
prosecution for such activity. In answer to this question, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter promulgated his "interlacing statutes" doctrine.
Therefore, whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the
Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law
and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a
harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct.
Were, then, the acts charged against the defendants prohibited,
or permitted, by these three interlacing statutes? If the facts laid in
the indictment come within the conduct enumerated in § 20 of the
Clayton Act they do not constitute a crime within the general terms
of the Sherman Law because of the explicit command of that Section
62. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
63. 312 U.S. at 234-35.
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that such conduct shall not be considered or held to be violations of
any law of the United States.
64
The effect of the Hutcheson case was therefore to immunize from Sher-
man Act prosecution any restraint of trade imposed by a labor union acting
alone.
65
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unsefishness of the end
of which the particular union activities are the means. 6
This dictum is prophetic and far-reaching. It means that the Sherman
Act is not the proper vehicle to police strikes and picketing, and that em-
ployees may combine even if the effect is to restrain trade; an effect legally
questionable when accomplished by employers.
6 7
Mr. Justice Stone, in his concurring opinion, thought it unnecessary to
pass on the effect of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, since the effect of the three
strikes and the picketing on commerce was merely that which was normally
incident to a local strike and hence not within the prohibition of the Sherman
Act.
6 8
Thus, after 1940 and Hutcheson there are three doctrines that can be
applied to antitrust-labor cases:
1. The Stone approach: The Sherman Act prohibits only those labor
activities which harm the commercial competitive system through
64. Id. at 231-32. Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent would not allow the transfer of con-
gressional intent from the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts to the Sherman Act.
By a process of construction never, as I think, heretofore indulged by this
court, it is now found that, because Congress forbade the issuing of injunctions
to restrain certain conduct, it intended to repeal the provisions of the Sherman
Act authorizing actions at law and criminal prosecutions for the commission of
torts and crimes defined by the anti-trust laws. The doctrine now announced
seems to be that an indication of a change of policy in an Act as respects one
specific item in a general field of the law, covered by an earlier Act, justifies this
court in spelling out an implied repeal of the whole of the earlier statute as
applied to conduct of the sort here involved. I venture to say that no court has
ever undertaken so radically to legislate where Congress has refused to do so.
Id. at 245. It is interesting to note that exactly two weeks later, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said in narrowly construing the Federal Trade Commission Act: "Translation
of an implication drawn from the special aspects of one statute to a totally different
statute is treacherous business." FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 249, 253 (1940).
65. Id. at 232.
66. One commentator raises the question that in Hutcheson Mr. Justice Frank-
furter never reached the point where he could apply the Coronado-Apex formula since
the union conduct involved no fraud or violence. SMITH & MERRIFIELD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW (1960). This is a doubtful viewpoint in the light
of Apex, in which it was said that violence by a union is not actionable under the
Sherman Act. See note 41 supra.
67. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 252, 265 (1955).
68. 312 U.S. at 239-40.
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raising prices, restricting production or otherwise controlling the
market.' 9
2. The Frankfurter approach: The Sherman Act prohibits only those
labor activities which are not exempt therefrom by the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
70
3. The Brandeis approach: The Sherman Act prohibits only those labor
activities which, on balancing the self-interest of labor with the neces-
sities of the business community, are unreasonable.
71
These doctrines, just as those promulgated by the courts prior to Apex,
Hutcheson and Bedford seem to be "judicial legislation."
Thurman Arnold, of the Department of Justice, did not agree with the
Court's language in the Hutcheson case.7 2 The Court dismissed, however,
three indictments in the antitrust-field brought by the Department of Justice
in the same term that Hutcheson was heard.
73
Allan Bradley v. Local 3, I.B.E.W. :74 CREATES THE
EXCEPTION TO LABOR'S EXEMPTION FROM
THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The first important judicial refinement of Hutcheson was the Allen
Bradley case. Hutcheson exempted a union from Sherman Act liability where
69. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. at 495-97.
70. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231.
71. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. at 58
(dissenting opinion).
72. Mr. Arnold announced that, notwithstanding the Hutcheson decision, the
following labor activities would be considered illegal under the Sherman Act
and prosecuted by the Department of Justice:
1. Where carried on by one union in disregard of another union's certifica-
tion by the National Labor Relations Board as proper bargaining representative.
2. Where evidencing an intent to erect a tariff wall around a given locality.
3. Where designed to exclude efficient methods of production from building
construction.
4. Where directed against small, independent business men.
5. Where effecting artificial price-fixing.
6. Where designed to make work.
9 U.S.L. WEEK 2485 (1941).
73. United States v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1940)
(secondary strike after another union's certification) ; United States v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 313 U.S. 539 (1940) (conspiracy to prevent labor-
saving truck mixers from entering the city) ; United States v. International Hod Carriers
& Common Laborers Dist. Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1940) (conspiracy against employers
who had recognized another union after an election).
The coup de grace was applied in United States v. Federation of Musicians, 318 U.S.
741 (1942), wherein the court sustained the dismissal of a complaint charging the
musicians' unions with a conspiracy to eliminate competition between recorded music
and "live" musicians.
74. 325 U.S. 797 (1945). For comments on this case see Bernhardt, The Allen
Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1094
(1962) ; Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 252 (1955) ; Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust and Allen Bradley,
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it was acting alone in its own "self-interest and did not combine with non-
labor groups." 75 Allen Bradley adds meaning to the language of the exception
that it "does not combine with non-labor groups.
'78
The facts of this case were that Local 3 of the IBEW had jurisdiction
over metropolitan New York and had organized most of the electrical equip-
ment manufacturers and contractors in the city. By virtue of collective bar-
gaining agreements, the contractors agreed to purchase electrical equipment
from New York City manufacturers under contract with the union, and the
manufacturers agreed to sell exclusively to those contractors in New York
City who employed members of Local 3. While the union prevented non-union
competition by traditional picketing and boycotting, the manufacturers raised
their prices and the contractors rigged bids. One need only peruse the dis-
trict court's opinion7 7 to appreciate the completeness of this market control.
Manufacturers were selling products outside the union's jurisdiction at half
the price the same products sold for within the city. Extra-territorial manu-
facturers were almost excluded from using their products in their exhibits
at the New York World's Fair, and the court found that no contractor could
do any important work in New York City unless the union agreed. 78 The con-
spiracy was engineered by a series of committees composed of representatives
of manufacturers, contractors and the union.
The excluded out-of-state manufacturers brought an action for violation
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and for an injunction restraining such
conduct.79 The district court held the union in violation of the Sherman Act
and entered a declaratory judgment and an injunction to that effect. 80 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that a labor dispute existed with a bona fide
labor objective, and therefore, the issuance of an injunction was prohibited. 81
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court delivered by Mr. Justice
Black held that the labor exemption created by the Norris-LaGuardia Act
did not extend to a situation in which a union participated in a management
violation of the Sherman Act.
But when the unions participated with a combination of business
men who had complete power to eliminate all competition among
themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation
13 LA. L.J. 957 (1952) ; Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Applica-
tion of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963) ; Comment, 67
YALE L.J. 893 (1958).
75. 312 U.S. at 232.
76. Ibid.
77. 41 F. Supp, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
78. Id. at 730.
79. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
80. 51 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), and 51 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
81. 145 F.2d 215, 223 (2d Cir. 1944).
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was created not included within the exemptions of the Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
8 2
For if business groups, by combining with labor unions, can fix
prices and divide up markets, it was little more than a futile gesture
for Congress to prohibit price fixing by business groups them-
selves.
83
He further acknowledged the fact that a labor dispute existed by stating:
It has been argued that no labor disputes existed. The argument
is untenable. We do not have here . . . a dispute between groups
of business men revolving solely around the price at which one
group would sell commodities to another group.
4
He went on, however, to hold that this was not significant, and the union
could be held to Sherman Act liability even though a labor dispute existed.
8 5
82. 325 U.S. at 809.
83. Id. at 810.
84. Id. at 807 n. 12.
85. There is, however, one line which we can draw with assurance that we
follow the congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared the concen-
trated power of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It
intended to outlaw business monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such
because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act.
Id. at 811.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts interpreted the majority opinion to
mean that the legality of the union's conduct depends on whether employers act singly
or jointly in agreeing to a union's demands.
As I understand the opinion of the court, such a programme, and such a
result, is wholly within the law provided only that employers do not jointly
agree to comply with the union's demands. Unless I misread the opinion, the
union is at liberty to impose every term and condition as shown by the record
in this case and to enforce those conditions and procure an agreement from each
employer to such conditions by calling strikes, by lockout, and boycott, provided
only such employer agrees for himself alone and not in concert with any other.
Id. at 814-15.
The learned Justice's interpretation has not been followed by subsequent cases. First,
a management violation of the antitrust laws is an indispensable requisite to a finding
of union violation thereof and since collective bargaining is usually accomplished through
a negotiator acting for a multi-employer group, a conspiracy may be inferred if the
requisite evidence is present. See Local 175 v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955). It also is conceivable that a single employer
may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act with union participation and thereby implicate
the union. See United States v. Blitz, 282 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1960) ; United States v.
Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Second, since union efforts to
dictate pricing policies are beyond the scope of mandatory bargaining, an employer
cannot plead that he had no choice but to allow a union to force a monopoly upon him.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (3), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (3) (1958); National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), as amended, 61 Stat. 142
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958). See United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 2265, 136
N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1962). In addition, by refusing to bargain on this subject, the union
would commit an unfair labor practice if it insisted upon it as a condition of reaching
agreement. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
Mr. Justice Murphy dissented on the ground that the facts did not substantiate the
majority's legal conclusions, even though he agreed with the majority's legal conclusions.
The union here has not in any true sense "aided" or "abetted" a primary
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In addition, the Apex doctrine, that the Sherman Act prohibits labor
activities which cause harm to the commercial competitive system,8 6 was
abrogated by Mr. Justice Black's admission that his ruling exempted from
the operation of the Sherman Act those union activities which may in and of
themselves restrain trade.
Our holding means that the same labor union activities may or
may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether
the union acts alone or in combination with business groups. This,
it is argued, brings about a wholly undesirable result--one which
leaves labor unions free to engage in conduct which restrains
trade. But the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is a
question for the determination of Congress.8
7
Thus, these congressionally permitted union activities may restrain trade in
and of themselves. There is no denying the fact that many of them do so,
both directly and indirectly.88
Allen Bradley also casts doubt on the views of the Attorney General's
report of 1955.89 There, it was stated that union activity "which intends or
achieves some direct commercial restraint"" or "is not in the course of a labor
dispute as defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act" 9' 1 would be vulnerable to
antitrust proceedings.
The Allen Bradley test is, therefore, that union activity is subject to the
Sherman Act if there exists: (1) an employer violation of the Sherman Act
apart from consideration of union activity and (2) evidence that the union
aided and abetted the activities constituting the violation by its participation
therein.
It is submitted that this test would withdraw from the judiciary the
necessity for determining the legitimacy of a labor objective, which is exactly
the thrust of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Hutcheson case.
Apart from the precedents, it seems unwise to resort to re-
violation of the Act by the employers. In the words of the union, it has been
"the dynamic force which has driven the employer-group to enter into agree-
ments" whereby trade has been affected. The fact that the union has expressed its
self-interest with the aid of others rather than solely by its own activities should
not be decisive of statutory liability. What is legal if done alone should not
become illegal if done with the assistance of others and with the same purpose in
mind. Otherwise a premium of unlawfulness is placed on collective bargaining.
Id. at 820.
In a sense, Mr. Justice Murphy is correct, since the union was more powerful than
the employers in this case. See 41 F. Supp. at 741-43.
86. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
87. 325 U.S. at 810.
88. Id. at 811.
89. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. (1955).




strictive interpretation of "labor dispute" as a means of cutting down
the scope of labor's present immunity from antitrust prosecution.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was the culmination of a -long drive
based on the belief that, in a dispute between employers and em-
ployees seeking higher wages and better conditions, the lawfulness
of concerted activities should depend upon overt acts and not a
judgment as to the propriety of their immediate objective. 92
While some lower courts have strayed from this policy, 93 most courts have
remained true to the proper standard.
9 4
A second refinement of the Hutcheson case is contained in United States
v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n.9 5 This case nullified a putative col-
lective bargaining agreement negotiated between two entrepreneur groups and
denied the agreement any benefit of labor's antitrust exemption, even though
it contained incidental labor provisions. Here the Government sought an in-
junction9 6 against a trade association of striking contractors employed in the
garment industry. The association had coerced jobbers into entering into an
agreement whereby the jobbers were to employ only association contractors,
refrain from dealing with non-members, accept no secret rebates and divide
92. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
269 (1955).
93. Pevely Dairy Co. v. Local 603, Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 174 F. Supp. 229
(E.D. Mo. 1959) ; Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
94. In each of the following cases the union was found to have participated in an
unlawful employer conspiracy and was. therefore not exempt from antitrust sanctions:
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947) ; United States v. Gasoline Retailers
Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Local 175 IBEW v. United States, 219 F.2d
431 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955) ; Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers
Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1954); Lumber Prod. Ass'n v. United
States, 144 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-
Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v. Greater Blouse, Shirt
and Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1959) ; United
States v. Milk Drivers Union, 153 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1957) ; United States v.
Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957) ; United States v. National
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 1956 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. f 68413 (D.N.J. 1956) ; Lystad
v. Local 223, Teamsters Union, 135 F. Supp. 337 (D. Ore. 1955) ; United States v.
National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1953) ; United States
v. Minneapolis Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 99 F. Supp. 75 (D. Minn. 1951).
In each of the following cases, the union was found to be immune from the antitrust
laws, since it had not aided an illegal conspiracy among employers: Hunt v. Crumboch,
324 U.S. 821 (1945) ; Meier & Pohlman Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 233 F.2d 296 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956); East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Team-
sters Union, 163 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1947) ; FTC v. California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n,
54 F.T.C. 835 (1957) ; Davis Pleating and Button Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress
Ass'n, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1956); United States v. Employing Plasterers
Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Ill. 1956) ; Red Owl Stores v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
109 F. Supp. 629 (D. Minn. 1953) ; Anderson Friberg, Inc. v. Justin R. Clary & Son,
Inc., 98 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; New Broadcasting Co. v. Kehoe, 94 F. Supp. 113
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
95. 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
96. Sherman Act § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1948).
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work equally among association contractors. The district court dismissed the
Government's case after trial, on the ground that the contractors' association
was not engaged in interstate commerce.97 The Government appealed directly
to the Supreme Court98 and the Court reversed the judgment of the district
court. The Court disposed of the commerce question with far-reaching
language.
The trial court appears to have dismissed the case chiefly on the
ground that the accused Association and its members were not them-
selves engaged in interstate commerce. This may or may not be the
the nature of their operation considered alone, but it does not matter.
Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the
line of movement of interstate commerce. The source of the re-
straints may be intrastate, as the making of a contract or combina-
tion usually is; the application of the restraint may be intrastate,
as it often is; but neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or
restrain commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce that
feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which
applies the squeeze. 99
The Court then held that the agreement clearly restrained trade in
violation of the Sherman Act.
In the light of its origin and the circumstances of the industry,
it seems clear that the intent and effect of the agreement is substan-
tially to restrict competition and to control prices and markets. It
prohibits the jobbers from awarding work to others (with minor ex-
ceptions) unless their prices are not "comparable" to those of the
Association members. It effects for Association members a virtual
monopoly of work at "comparable" prices. Work given by members
must be allocated "equitably," not by reference to price or quality
of work. And it apparently contemplates boycott by the Association
of jobbers who do not subscribe to these terms. That such a contract
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act is obvious, even if
the restraints in actual practice under it do not go beyond its express
terms, which the evidence indicates to be likely. 100
Defendants contended that the labor provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement exempted them from the operation of the antitrust laws. The Court
held that this was an agreement between independent businessmen and did
not benefit the union.
10 1
97. 75 F. Supp. 112 (D.C. Mass. 1947).
98. See note 60 supra.
99. 336 U.S. at 464.
100. Id. at 463.
101. It is argued that inclusion of the labor provisions makes the agreement
immune from attack under the antitrust laws. The stitching contractor, although
he furnishes chiefly labor, also utilizes the labor through machines and has his
rentals, capital costs, overhead and profits. He is an entrepreneur, not a laborer.
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The Court in dictum reinforced the Allen Bradley philosophy. It said in
substance, that even if the union did participate in this scheme, it would not
immunize the employers from antitrust liability. In effect, therefore, once the
employers are found to have violated the Sherman Act, then labor is also in
violation if it has participated therein.
The trial court found no evidence that the Union participated in
making the agreement. And if it did, benefits to organized labor can-
not be used as a cat's-paw to pull employers' chestnuts out of the
antitrust fires. 10 2
A third judicial refinement of Hutcheson is contained in Los Angeles
Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United States.'03 This case stands
for the proposition that independent businessmen who have no employee
status and lack a genuine labor objective are prohibited from joining an
otherwise legitimate labor union for the purpose of attracting labor's anti-
trust exemption.10 4 This was a civil action brought by the Government to
enjoin 0 5 the union, its business agent and four "grease peddlers" from
violating the Sherman Act. The defendants entered into a detailed stipulation
of the facts, wherein they admitted all of the allegations in the complaint
"and agreed to the ultimate conclusion that they had unlawfully combined and
conspired in unreasonable restraint of foreign trade and commerce in yellow
grease. '10 6 The district court enjoined the specific practices found to be un-
lawful and ordered that the grease peddlers be divested of union member-
ship.'0 7 The defendants appealed,' 0 8 contending "that the District Court was
in error in ordering termination of union membership of these independent
businessmen."' 1 9
The facts of the case were as follows. There were eight firms in Los
Angeles County that were engaged in the business of processing yellow grease.
The finished product was obtained by removing moisture and solid impurities
from waste restaurant grease. This product was then sold to overseas pur-
• . . The labor provisions were incorporated into the second proposal after the
first was rejected as violating the antitrust laws and seem to give nothing to
labor that it was not already getting for itself from other as well as from these
manufacturers. The restraints here went beyond limiting work to Union shops;
it limited it to those Union shops also members of the Association.
Id. at 463-64.
102. Id. at 464.
103. 371 U.S. 94 (1962).
104. A narrow statement of the holding of this case is necessary because of Mr.
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion which limits the potential scope of the majority
opinion. See id. at 107 n.2.
105. Sherman Act § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1948).
106. 371 U.S. at 95-96.
107. 196 F. Supp. 12, 21 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
108. See note 60 supra.
109. 371 U.S. at 96.
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chasers. The grease processors procured the waste restaurant grease in two
ways; either directly from large restaurants, hotels and institutions, with the
grease being picked up by their employees who were members of the appel-
lant union, or by purchase from independent entrepreneurs, i.e., "grease
peddlers," who had various sources of supply. Most of the 35 or 40 grease
peddlers in the area joined the union at the instigation of the appellant's
business agent "for the purpose of increasing the margin between the prices
they paid for grease and the prices at which they sold it to the processors.""()
Union agents fixed the sales price and allocated routes to the grease peddlers.
These orders were enforced through the exercise or threatened exercise of
strikes and boycotts against processors who bought from non-union grease
peddlers and by threatening the grease peddlers who violated the price agree-
ment or the route allocation with suspension of their union membership.
The Court quickly disposed of the narrow issue of the divestiture of the
grease peddlers of union membership.
The narrow question which emerges in this case, therefore,
is whether businessmen who combine in an association which would
otherwise be properly subject to dissolution under the antitrust laws
can immunize themselves from that sanction by the simple expedient
of calling themselves "Local 626-B" of a labor union. We think there
is nothing in the Norris-LaGuardia Act nor in the Clayton Act nor
in the federal policy which these statutes reflect, to prevent a court
from dissolving the ties which bound these businessmen together and
which bound them to the appellant union, in the circumstances of
the present case.'
The fundamental dispute between the majority opinion, the concurring
opinion, and the dissenting opinion in the Los Angeles Meat Drivers case,
concerned the proposition that a labor union may have a genuine labor ob-
jective in organizing a group of independent contractors who have an eco-
nomic interrelationship with union members or are in job or wage com-
petition with them." 2 While Mr. Justice Stewart implied this proposition in
the majority opinion,113 Mr. Justice Goldberg expressly emphasized that the
district court was in error in limiting a labor union's legitimate interest in
organizing self-employed entrepreneurs to job and wage competition.
1 14
110. Id. at 97.
111. Id. at 101.
112. See Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) ; Bakery Drivers
Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm
Prods., 311 U.S. 91 (1940). See generally Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competi-
tion: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L. J. 14, 54
(1963).
113. 371 U.S. at 103.
114. Id. at 104.
Notwithstanding what I take to be its disapproval of the views of the district
judge, the Court correctly sustains the judgment expelling the peddlers from mem-
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Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, believed the stipulation
that the grease peddlers were independent contractors and that there was
no economic interrelationship between the peddlers and the procesdor's em-
ployees, was a stipulation of law which the Court was not bound to accept." 5
He stated that the grease peddlers were employees within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act," 6 that a labor dispute existed, and that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited any injunction affecting union mem-
bership.
117
The majority opinion rested heavily on the case of Columbia River Co. v.
Hinton,"18 wherein a fish processor brought an action enjoining an association
of unionized fishermen from regulating the terms under which fish were to
be sold. Mr. Justice Black said in the Hinton case:
The controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish
buyers. The sellers are not employees of the petitioners or of any
other employers, nor do they seek to be. On the contrary, their de-
sire is to continue to operate as independent businessmen, free from
such controls as an employer might exercise. That some of the fisher-
men have a small number of employees of their own, who are also
members of the Union, does not alter the situation. For, the dispute
here, relating solely to the sale of fish, does not place in controversy
the wages or hours, or other terms and conditions of employment,
of these employees. 119
bership in the union, not because there is absent the job or wage competition
erroneously considered crucial by the District Court, but because there does not
appear in this record any other legitimate labor union interest presently being
served by organization of these peddlers.
Id. at 104-05.
115. Id. at 112.
116. Mr. Justice Douglas cited NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944), to indicate a proper definition of "employee" under the NLRA. 371 U.S. at 108.
When Hearst was decided the NLRA provided: "The term 'employee' shall include any
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this
subchapter explicitly states otherwise .... " National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 49
Stat. 450 (1935) (now, as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1947)). In
Hearst the Court reasoned that fulltime "newsboys" were employees because of the control
the newspaper publishers exercised over the newsboys' profits, take home pay, conditions
of work, and the general terms of employment. Nevertheless, the Court held that the
meaning of employee must not be based exclusively on common law principles of agency,
but, rather the statute must be interpreted in the light of the end it was meant to achieve,
i.e., the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife by considering all the economic
factors in controversies arising over wages, hours and working conditions. See also United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 731 (1947). However, after Hearst the statute was amended
specifically to exclude from the definition of employee "any individual having the status
of an independent contractor." National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1947). Congress intended the amendment to give the
terms "employee" and "independent contractor" their conventional meanings under the
general principles of the law of agency. The amendment makes it clear that whether or
not a person is an employee is always a question of law. 93 CONG. REc. 6441-42 (1947).
117. 371 U.S. at 112.
118. 315 U.S. 143 (1941).
119. Id. at 147.
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It is submitted that Hinton and the cases following it are essentially cor-
rect, even though the Court's language in Hinton dealing with the right of a
labor unn to organize independent businessmen is narrower in scope than the
language used in the majority and concurring opinions in the Los Angeles
Meat Drivers case. Both Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg, in
their opinions in Los Angeles Meat Drivers, would agree that an association
of independent businessmen may not attract labor's antitrust exemption by
joining an otherwise legitimate union if they have no "employee status" and
lack a genuine labor objective. Both these requirements were present in
the fish industry cases. Since the fishermen were independent entrepreneurs,
they had no economic interrelationship with the other union members; and
their alleged desire was only to "stabilize" the selling price of fish.
120
LEGISLATION SUBSEQUENT TO Hutcheson
REGULATING LABOR WHEN IT ACTS ALONE
It is clear that direct commercial restraints imposed by unions acting
alone and not in combination with non-labor groups do not fall within the
prohibition of the Sherman Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 121 regardless of the presence of violence or fraud.
122
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the
end of which the particular union activities are the means.
123
120. Gulf Coast Shrimpers and Oyster Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658 (5th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956) ; McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252
(1st Cir. 1956); United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, 183 F. Supp. 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hawaiian Tuna Packers v. International Longshoremen and Ware-
housemens' Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii 1947) ; FTC v. California Fish Canners
Ass'n Inc., 54 F.T.C. 120 (1957) ; FTC v. Puget Sound Salmon Canners, Inc., 52 F.T.C.
1251, aff'd, 53 F.T.C. 342 (1956).
121. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952). The FTC has concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of
Justice over practices which fall within the purview of Sherman Act. Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act encompasses both full-blown and incipient restraints on
competition, FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). The FTC has a zone of exclusive authority
under section 5 to restrain in their incipiency arrangements and practices which threaten
to ripen into Sherman Act proportions, whereas the Department of Justice is limited to
attacks upon accomplished violations of the Sherman Act, FTC v. Cement Institute, supra.
The FTC has prosecuted a number of cases in the labor-antitrust field. See FTC v.
California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835 (1957) ; FTC v. California Fish
Canners Ass'n, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 120 (1957) ; FTC v. Puget Sound Salmon Canners, Inc.,
52 F.T.C. 1251 (1956); FTC v. Alaska Salmon Indus., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 863 (1954) ; FTC
v. Millinery Stabilization Comm'n, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 1621 (1951) ; FTC v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 27 F.T.C. 1138 (1938).
122. See note 66 supra.
123. 312 U.S. at 232.
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Our holding means that the same labor union activities may or
may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether
the union acts alone or in combination with business groups. This,
it is argued, brings about a wholly undesirable result--one which
leaves labor unions free to engage in conduct which restrains trade.
But the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is a ques-
tion for the determination of Congress .... [I]t is true that many
labor union activities do substantially interrupt the course of trade
and that these activities, lifted out of the prohibitions of the Sherman
Act, include substantially all, if not all, of the normal peaceful activi-
ties of labor unions.
1 24
Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendment in 1947,125 only
the Wagner Act 12 6 regulated management activity. In addition to Taft-Hart-
ley, Congress furnished the NLRB with further regulatory powers over
unions when it passed the Landrum-Griffin Amendment in 1959,127 which
dealt with two other sources of direct commercial restraints, "hot cargo"
clauses, 2 8 and organizational picketing. 129 A proposed amendment to the
Taft-Hartley Act to withdraw the exemption afforded labor unions when
they exert direct commercial restraints was specifically rejected in conference.
Since the matters dealt with in this section have to a large measure
been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the confer-
ence agreement contains effective provisions directly dealing with
boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted from the conference
agreement.1
30
Federal and state law has filled the vacuum created by Hutcheson and
Allen Bradley when labor unions acting alone exert direct commercial re-
straints. The states have always had the power to prevent union violence
and have not been reluctant to use this power. State courts have issued in-
junctions,' 3 ' sizeable damage verdicts with punitive damages 13 2 and criminal
convictions 133 to prevent such violence. In addition, both the Taft-Hartley
124. 325 U.S. at 810.
125. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-59
(1958).
126. Unfair labor practice provisions of National Labor Relations Act § 8, 49 Stat.
452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958).
127. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (Supp. IV, 1963).
128. 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
129. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (Supp. IV, 1963).
130. H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947).
131. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
132. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) ; United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
133. Illinois v. Guzziardo, 4 Ill. App. 2d 355, 124 N.E.2d 39 (1955) ; Carr v.
Tennessee, 30 CCH Lab. Cas. 70108 (Tenn. 1956).
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Act 8 4 and the Landrum-Griffin Act' 8 5 prohibit union violence, and the Hobbs
Act,l ' Lea Act, l a7 and the Byrnes Act' 8  prohibit specific types of union
violence.
Secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes are regulated by section
8(b) (4) and 8(b) (4) (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act'3 9 and the NLRB must
seek temporary injunction whenever reasonable cause exists to believe that
a union has violated 8(b) (4) or 8(b) (4) (d).1 40 In addition, section 303 of
the Taft-Hartley Act' 4 ' gives a right of action for damages to anyone suffer-
ing a business or a property loss as a result of a prohibited boycott. "Feather-
bedding" is also regulated to some extent.
1 42
Organizational activities are also circumscribed. A union may not exert
improper pressure to induce workers to join the union.14 3 The NLRB closely
defines the procedures for affording employees freedom of choosing a union'
44
and union picketing for organizational purposes is limited.
45
134. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (1), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1) (1958) ; § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1958),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1962). See In re Int'l Longshoremen's
and Warehousemen's Union, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948).
135. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 401 (e), 73 Stat. 532
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (Supp. III, 1962) ; § 610, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 530
(Supp. III, 1962). See Johnson v. Local 58, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 39 CCH Lab.
Cas. 1 66260 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
136. 60 Stat. 420 (1946), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1958). A felony to obstruct
interstate commerce by robbery or extortion. See United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889
(3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952) ; United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d
665 (3d Cir. 1955).
137. 60 Stat. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1958). Unlawful by use of threats, force
or other means to compel a broadcasting company to hire more employees than it needs.
See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
138. 49 Stat. 1899 (1936), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1949) (prohibits the inter-
state transportation of strikebreakers). See International Union of Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers v. Tennessee Copper Co., 31 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
139. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (4) (Supp. III, 1962). See Local 760, Fruit and Vegetable Packers Union v.
N.L.R.B., 55 L.R.R.M. 2961 (1964); NLRB v. Local 1212, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
364 U.S. 573 (1961).
140. National Labor Relations Act § 10(L), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(L) (Supp. III, 1962). See Penello v. Seafarers' Union, 32 CCH Lab. Cas.
1 70701 (D. Va. 1957).
141. 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (Supp. III, 1962). See International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952).
142. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (6), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (6) (1958). See American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100
(1953).
143. National Labor Relations Act §§ b(1)-(2), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(b) (1) (2) (1958). See In re Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union,
79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948).
144. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c) (3), (f)-(h) (Supp. III, 1962) ; 29 C.F.R.
88 101, 102 (Supp. 1962). See Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1963).
145. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (7), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
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"Hot cargo" clauses are prohibited by section 8(e) of the Landrum-
Griffin Act, 146 which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer and
a union to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
the employer ceases, or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain, from handling,
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of
any other employer, or cease doing business with any other person. It also
provides that any contract "entered into heretofore or hereafter containing
such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void."
Since Pennington v. UMW 147 will shortly be considered in depth, it is
well to discuss the case as an example of how a labor union may violate
labor laws when acting independently of an employer-conspiracy and may also
violate the Sherman Act when participating in an employer-conspiracy.
On February 7, 1963, the General Counsel of the NLRB issued a com-
plaint against three officers of the UMW and three officers of the Bituminous
Coal Operators Association, all six being members of the Joint Industry
Contract Committee established by the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement of 1950. The complaint alleged in substance, that the union en-
tered into a written contract with the signatory operators, containing a clause
in which the signatory operators agreed to cease and refrain from handling,
using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of other
employers and to cease doing business with other persons; and did at all
times maintain this contract. The union denied the commission of any unfair
labor practices. Therefore, the facts were stipulated and the case was transferred
to the Board, waiving a hearing before a trial examiner.1 48 The Board then
considered the contract, the heart of which was the protective wage clause:
[T]he Operators agree that all bituminous coal mined, produced, or
prepared by them, or any of them under a subcontract arrangement,
shall be or shall have been mined or produced under terms and con-
ditions which are favorable to the employees as those provided for
in this Contract.1
49
A further provision of the clause provided:
[A]ny operator signatory hereto who is a party to any agreement
inconsistent with the obligations assumed hereunder shall not main-
tain such inconsistent agreement in effect beyond the first date at
§ 158(b) (7) (Supp. 1959). In addition, organizational picketing is the subject of a man-
datory section 10(L) injunction. See note 134 supra and Local 743, Warehouse & Mail
Order Employees, 140 N.L.R.B. 707 (1963).
146. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1963). In addition, this is
subject to a mandatory section 10(L) injunction, see note 140 supra.
147. 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 929 (1964).
148. 144 N.L.R.B. 1 (1963).
149. Id. at 7.
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which such agreement may be terminated by him in accordance
with its terms. 150
The Board determined that the protective wage clause violated section
8(e).
On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the Protective Wage
Clause requires Signatory Operators to cease and to refrain from
doing business with nonsignatory producers, unless such producers
adopt terms and conditions of work comparable to those established
in the BCWA. That agreement contains comprehensive and detailed
provisions regulating terms and conditions of employment, including
provisions requiring contributions to the Union's Welfare and Re-
tirement Fund. It is, therefore, apparent that realistically appraised,
the clause, in design and intent, requires unorganized producers to
adopt Union standards if they are to remain or become eligible to
receive "subcontracts" from Signatory Operators. It is well estab-
lished that such a limitation on an employer's right to do business
with another, whether explicitly or implicitly imposed by a collective-
bargaining agreement, violates Section 8(e). We, therefore, con-
clude that the Protective Wage Clause at issue herein, violates Sec-
tion 8(e) of the Act.151
Thus, it seems manifestly clear that although Hutcheson nullified judicial
regulation of union activities such as secondary boycotts, jursidictional
disputes and consumer boycotts through the vehicle of the Sherman Act,
Congress has regulated these activities of labor unions when acting apart from
a management conspiracy in a more meaningful and comprehensive manner.
Furthermore, the Taft-Hartley Act and the Landrum-Griffin Act pro-
vide the damaged plaintiff with additional weapons for his antitrust-labor
arsenal. Section 303152 of the Taft-Hartley Act gives anyone injured by the
proscribed activities' 1 3 an action for damages.15 4 The elements necessary for
proving a union violation of section 8(b) of the NLRA, as amended, are
the same as those required under section 303. However, it has been held that
even though the NLRB has declared that a violation did not occur under
section 8(b), a federal court jury may find a violation and award damages
on the same state of facts under section 303.155 The fact that a cause of
150. Id. at 7, 8.
151. Id. at 12.
152. 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (Supp. III, 1962). See note 141 supra.
153. Secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes and hot cargo agreements.
154. State courts may also grant damages to an injured party for violence on the
part of a union. See notes 131 and 132 supra.
155. International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237
(1952). Courts may not award punitive damages under section 303. See UMW v. Patton,
211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954). Speculative damages may
be allowed even though they appear punitive. See International Longshoremen's Union v.
Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 225 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956) ;
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action exists under the NLRA or common law does not preclude the prospec-
tive plaintiff from a treble damage action under the Sherman Act. 150 A plain-
tiff choosing, however, between a section 303 proceeding for damages and an
antitrust action must weigh the treble damages and attorney's fees of the
latter 157 against the less difficult proof of the former.' 58
A RECENT APPLICATION AND MISAPPLICATION
Pennington has recently caused considerable unrest among the antitrust-
labor bar. In this case the trustees of the UMW welfare and retirement fund
brought an action against a small coal company to recover royalty payments due
pursuant to a wage agreement negotiated between the union and the mine com-
pany.159 The mine owner did not deny the execution of the agreement, but
contended that it was invalid because of duress and antitrust violation. The
nature of the violation alleged was that the UMW and certain large coal
companies had entered into a conspiracy to stabilize the "economics" of the
bituminous coal industry by eliminating small producers unable to pay high
wages and welfare fund royalties, thereby raising the level of salaries of union
members and leaving the industry's business to the major coal companies.
Treble damages were sought under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 0 0 for viola-
tion of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. After the union's motion to
dismiss the cross-claim was overruled,' 0 ' it filed its answer to the cross-claim,
denying the alleged conspiracy, and contending that it was exempt from the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by virtue of section 6 of
the Clayton Act. 162 After trial the jury awarded the defendant mine owner
damages for the antitrust violation in the amount of $270,000 (trebled), and
the plaintiff-trustees recovered $55,982.62 in royalty payments, which sum
was reduced by the district court to $43,424.22. The district court also set
aside the finding of the jury that the trustes had violated the Sherman Act for
Curto v. International Longshoremen's Union, 107 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Ore. 1952), aff'd
sub nom. This assumes also that the NLRB may bring appropriate unfair labor practice
proceedings against a proposed union respondent and, in some instances, obtain injunctive
relief. See note 140 supra. In addition the Attorney General may proceed against unions
under the Taft-Hartley Act in case of emergency and on special order from the President.
61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1952). See United Steelworkers of Am. v. United
States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
156. Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d at 810; Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc.,
318 F.2d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 1963). State antitrust laws, however, are preempted by the
NLRA. See Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
157. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 713 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
158. Note, Union-Induced Employer Refusals to Deal: A Merger of Antitrust
Standards and NLRB Expertise Suggested, 67 YALE L.J. 893, 910 n.51 (1958).
159. 325 F.2d at 806.
160. 26 Stat. 210 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
161. The cross-claim was against the union, since only the trustees of the union
were original plaintiffs.
162. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
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lack of evidence of their participation, but allowed the finding to stand against
the union.16 3 The union and the defendant-mine owner appealed to the court
of appeals, but to no avail.
The purpose in discussing this case is to view it in its historical perspective
and see if it modifies established principles in the labor-antitrust field."
The small mine owner contended in Pennington, that prior to 1950 the
economics of the bituminous coal industry had become unstable by reason of
the fact that there was more coal produced than the market required; this
overproduction was caused in part by the growth of small independent non-
union producers. He alleged that the union first proposed that the working
time of employees be reduced to three days a week. However, the major coal
companies opposed this, and threafter came a marked change in the union's
position, culminating with the signing of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement in 1950. It was alleged that the plan of the conspiracy was to
stabilize the coal industry through mechanization of the mines, thereby, re-
ducing the number of employees required. This mechanization would ulti-
mately impose uniform high wage rates and welfare payments tailored to the
ability of the large mine owners' financial resources, and thus, drive out the
small mine owners who could not meet the increased financial burdens. The
evidence of the alleged conspiracy which follows was circumstantial.
The wage agreement contained a "land lease" provision under which
the signatory operators agreed that the wage agreement covered the operation
of all coal mines owned or leased by them or by any subsidiary or affiliate at
the time of the agreement's signing, and all mines acquired during the term
of the agreement. The small coal company contended that this prevented the
small coal companies who were unable to pay the union wage and welfare
royalties from operating this coal land and that there was little other good coal
land available. In addition, the wage agreement contained a "protective wage
clause" whereby the signatory operators agreed that they would not buy, sell,
or deal in coal mined by companies who did not pay the same labor costs as
contained in the wage agreement. It was contended that this "hot cargo"
agreement eliminated the small mine owners from the market of selling to the
large coal companies who purchased coal to apply on long-term contracts.' 6
There was evidence that the union used violence to impose the wage agreement
on small non-union mines and that the union heavily litigated any arrearages
in unpaid royalties under the welfare fund.166 The UMW acquired a sub-
163. It is submitted that this dismissal of the case against the trustees was correct in
the light of Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1946), which
required clear proof of actual participation.
164. Possible procedural errors will not be discussed.




stantial portion of the common and preferred stock of one of the major coal
companies and held substantial blocks of the securities of two other major
coal companies as collateral for loans. 167 In 1955 the union and two major
coal producers successfully sought a determination by the Secretary of Labor
that a higher minimum wage should prevail in the coal industry under the
Walsh-Healey Act 1 68 than in other industries. 169 This minimum wage, which
was higher than wages paid by non-union operators, it was alleged, prevented
the small mine owners from bidding on TVA term contracts, but left available
to them contracts for less than $10,000, which were exempt from the Walsh-
Healey Act. There was evidence that the major coal companies dumped dis-
tress coal on the TVA spot market which was normally sold in other
markets.
170
One of the contentions in the court of appeals was that the union was
exempt from the antitrust laws under section 6 of the Clayton Act. Judge
Miller disposed of it by saying:
Although some question about this may have existed prior to 1945,
the Supreme Court held in that year that although an exemption
exists in cases where a labor union acts alone in furtherance of its
own purposes, it does not exist in cases where a labor union combines
with a nonlabor organization to restrain competition in, or to monop-
olize the marketing of, goods in interstate commerce.
1 1
The main contention of the union on appeal was that there was no direct
evidence of a conspiracy between the union and the major coal companies and
therefore insufficient evidence from which to infer a conspiracy. 72 It is
settled beyond question that direct evidence of a conspiracy is unnecessary;
a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
1 73
The union further contended that a conspiracy may not be inferred from
employee conduct sanctioned by the NLRA.17 4 It is submitted that a multi-
167. Ibid.
168. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1952).
169. 325 F.2d at 814.
170. The coal mines owned in part by the union took part in this dumping practice.
171. Id. at 809. Although the court of appeals correctly cited Allen Bradley for this
proposition, reference to the Meat Drivers case may have been inappropriate, in that the
latter involved an association of independent businessmen prohibited from joining a union
to attract labor's antitrust exemption. See notes 103-115 supra and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 810.
173. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; Interstate
Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1913) ; Local 175, IBEW v. United States, 219 F.2d 431
(6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1954) ; Mueller, The Federal Antitrust Laws,
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 394 (1961).
174. 325 F.2d at 808. This contention was raised in the union's petition for certiorari.
1. May a labor union be held a conspirator under the Sherman Antitrust Act
where it has achieved an industry-wide multi-employer collective bargaining
agreement, negotiated in accordance with procedures established by law, which
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employer collective bargaining agreement, although it may have the natural
effect of restraining trade, is not a violation of the Sherman Act in and of
itself.17 5 Judge Taylor, in charging the jury adequately covered this point:
It is the objective of any national labor organization to eliminate
price competition based on differences in labor standards, but this
effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtail-
ment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act. It is not
a violation of the anti-trust laws for a labor organization to bargain
collectively with a multi-employer group. Hence, multi-employer bar-
gaining in the coal industry is not a violation of the antitrust laws. 17"
Although the union contended that a collective bargaining agreement could
not be a part of conspiratorial conduct, the words of Mr. Justice Black in
Allen Bradley refute this contention:
It was but one element in a far larger program in which contractors
and manufacturers united with one another to monopolize all the
business in New York City, to bar all other business men from that
area, and to charge the public prices above a competitive level. It is
true that victory of the union in its disputes, even had the union
acted alone, might have added to the cost of goods, or might have
resulted in individual refusals of all of their employers to buy elec-
trical equipment not made by Local No. 3. So far as the union might
have achieved this result acting alone, it would have been the natural
consequence of labor union activities exempted by the Clayton Act
from the coverage of the Sherman Act. But when the unions par-
ticipated with a combination of business men who had complete
power to eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent
all competition from others, a situation was created not included
within the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
177
The difficulty with Pennington is not the fact that a "labor dispute"
may have existed, which is irrelevant, 7 8 but with the evidence from which
results in stabilizing wage rates and working conditions above the ability of some
employers to pay?
3. Where a labor union is charged with having conspired with employer groups
in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act when it executed an industry-wide,
multi-employer collective bargaining agreement in conformity with injunctive
orders of a federal district court, union denials of the conspiracy are uncon-
tradicted, may a court or jury infer the existence of a conspiracy from union
activities either sanctioned under law or within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board, in light of the antitrust immunity of labor unions and the
clear proof requirement of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act?
UMW v. Pennington, Oct. Term 1963, appeal docketed, No. 867, United States Supreme
Court, petition for cert., p. 4.
175. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 809 (1944); Douds v.
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 101 F. Supp. 970 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Cox,
Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1955);
Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1018, 1051 (1945).
176. 1961 Trade Cas. J 70036 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
177. 325 U.S. at 809.
178. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
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the management conspiracy was inferred. Some means in and of themselves
when individually employed are lawful, but these lawful means may be
utilized to acomplish an unlawful conspiracy. 179 Labor proponents would
resist this contention on the ground that the tremendous struggle to legalize
their economic weapons is resulting in them being whittled away.' 80 The
wage agreement containing the "land lease" provision, the "protective wage"
clause, the union litigating arrearages in royalty payments,' 8x union vio-
lence' 8 2 and the fact that the union was a substantial owner of a few of the
major coal companies, are not violations of the Sherman Act in and of
themselves.'8 3 It would seem that the only overt manifestation of an illegal
conspiracy was the following:
[T]he conspirators adopted the practice of predatory pricing to
drive the spot coal market price down to a price which a small pro-
ducer could not meet at a profit; that in this phase of the campaign,
the West Kentucky Coal Company and its subsidiary, Nashville Coal
Company, took the most prominent part; that the Union had over
$25,000,000.00 of capital invested in these companies; that large
amounts of tonnage were dumped upon the spot coal market of
TVA at constantly reduced prices; that the spot coal price was
beaten down to such an extent that Phillips Brothers suffered large
losses in trying to retain their position in that market and finally
had to abandon their sale of coal to that market and it became
necessary for them to abandon the partnership business.
8 4
The scholastic hesitancy with Pennington is therefore, with the quantum
of proof from which the management conspiracy was inferred' 8 5 by the jury,
and not any doctrinal difficulty.' 8 6
179. The means utilized to accomplish an unlawful conspiracy may be lawful in and
of themselves, but if they are part of a scheme to effectuate a conspiracy, the end result
is unlawful. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; United
States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911).
180. UMW v. Pennington, Oct. Term 1963, appeal docketed, No. 867, United States
Supreme Court, petition for cert., pp. 25, 26 [hereinafter cited as petition for cert.].
181. 1961 Trade Cas. ff 70036 (E.D. Tenn. 1961). Similarly, the union contended that
the district court judge committed reversible error in admitting evidence concerning the
union's efforts to obtain the Walsh-Healey wage ruling and to have the TVA enforce
such determination. 325 F.2d at 816; petition for cert., pp. 35, 36, relying on the case of
Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
The Noerr case held that restraints effectuated by a combination of persons who influenced
the passage of legislation are not violative of the Sherman Act for public policy consider-
ations. It is difficult to appreciate the analogy to the Pennington case, since this was but one
element in the entire scheme. See 325 F.2d at 817.
182. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
183. See charge to the jury, 1961 Trade Cas. ff 70036 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
184. Ibid.
185. Local 175, IBEW v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 917 (1955). A conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence in an
antitrust-labor case.
186. One commentator has mentioned that "no union has been convicted under the
[Vol. 69
ANTITRUST LAW AND UNION ACTIVITY
The Jewel'Tea Co. v. Local Unions, Meat Cutters8 7 controversy illus-
trates that familiarity by the courts and the practicing bar with the precedents
involved in the field of antitrust-labor litigation should replace the hue and
cry for more legislation in this area, and more litigation would ensue with
clearly defined issues. 8 8 Jewel Tea, a supermarket.chain, began suit in 1959
for a declaratory judgment, injunction, 8 9 and treble damages190 against
locals of the Meat Cutters Union and the Associated Food Retailers of
Greater Chicago for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Plaintiff alleged a conspiracy between the association of independent retail
stores and the unions to "suppress competition among retail meat markets
in the Chicago area" by preventing the sale of fresh meats before 9 A.M. and
after 6 P.M. Mondays through Sundays, 191 and "to monopolize for members
of the defendant unions the retail portion of the trade or commerce in such
meats."'192 A motion to dismiss the complaint was overruled,'193 but the
district court judge granted a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal to
the court of appeals and stayed further proceedings in the case on the ground
that there were "controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial
• ground for difference of opinion.19 4 The court of appeals affirmed the ruling
of the district court and remanded the case. 195
One of the grounds raised by the unions for dismissal of the complaint
was that the alleged controversy regulating market operating hours con-
stituted a labor dispute over which the district court had no jurisdiction. 196
Instead of denying the motion to dismiss on the ground that the existence of
a labor dispute is immaterial,'197 both the district court and the court of ap-
Allen Bradley doctrine without an explicit mention of direct price fixing as one of the
elements of the offense" and that this should be decisive in applying the implied con-
spiracy doctrine. Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Con-
flicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1100 n.30, 1108 n.58 (1962). It is submitted that since
a management conspiracy is the sine qua non to finding a union in violation of the Sherman
Act, that the usual Sherman Act doctrines should be equally as applicable when a labor
union is involved. Conspiring to drive a small coal operator out of business is just as much
a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as price fixing. See Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) ; Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
187. 1959 Trade Cas. 69329 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
188. For example, in Senator McClellan's bill to have the Sherman Act apply to
certain union activity regardless of a finding of management conspiracy. S. RF.P. No.
2753, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
189. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1934).
190. 26 Stat. 210 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
191. 1959 Trade Cas. at 75227.
192. Ibid. It is difficult to reconcile this allegation with the holding in Hutcheson,
that a union cannot violate the Sherman Act when it acts alone.
193. 1959 Trade Cas. at 75228.
194. 1959 Trade Cas. at 75658.
195. 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960).
196. 1959 Trade Cas. at 75228.
197. Note 84 supra and accompanying text.
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peals erroneously ruled that since the union activity exceeded the confines
of a genuine labor dispute it was not exempt from the impact of the antitrust
laws:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was specifically intended to protect the
normal activities of workingmen to form a union and to act together
to further their interests as members of the union even though such
union activities might to some extent affect interstate commerce ...
but where labor unions combine upon objects outside the field of
labor relations they do become amenable to the Sherman Act.1
98
An employer has the right and it is his duty, if he is to survive
commercially, first to determine the needs of the public, second to
provide a time, a place and facilities for meeting those needs, and
third to provide under the terms of the National Labor Relations
Act, services of employees to accomplish the foregoing objectives.
The rights of labor attach only to the third, and if any effort is made
by labor to infringe rights of the employer in the first or second
field, it is not shielded from the sword of the antitrust laws.' 99
The case on remand from the court of appeals was tried without a
jury2°0 and at the close of the plaintiff's case, the unions, the Secretary and
Treasurer of the Retail Grocers' Association and the association moved to
dismiss the action. The court granted the motion as to the Secretary, Treas-
urer, and the association, saying:
Yet, realistically speaking, there is absent any evidence showing
Bromann or Associated, or both, conspired with the defendant
Unions in forcing the restrictive clause upon Jewel. One would be
pyramiding inferences upon inferences in order to find such as
a fact.
2 0 1
This should have been the end of the case. If the district court had correctly
construed Allen Bradley, the absence of a management conspiracy would have
precluded a finding of a Sherman Act violation against the unions. How-
ever, the court denied the unions' motion to dismiss, and allowed the defend-
ant unions to present their case. Thereafter, the plaintiff's complaint was
dismissed after full trial as to the unions.2 0 2 The theory of the dismissal was
that the unions acted in their own self-interest in electing not to engage in
198. 1959 Trade Cas. at 75228.
199. 274 F.2d at 217. This error was also committed in the cases cited in note 93
supra.
200. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions, Meat Cutters, 215 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
201. Id. at 839. The evidence is summarized in Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions,
Meat Cutters, supra note 200, at 839. This finding is substantiated by the evidence insofar
as the grocers' association proposed that the union allow its employees to work at night.
Id. at 843. All employers joined in this request. Id. at 843, 845.
202. 215 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
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any night work and thus, were exempt from the operation of the Sherman
Act. Furthermore, even if labor were not exempt, there was no harmful
effect on competition.
20 3
The plaintiff, Jewel Tea, then appealed the judgments of dismissal to
the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court and
directed that it enter a declaratory judgment and an injunction as stated in the
complaint, and "award to plaintiff such monetary relief as may be appropriate
under the court's opinion. '20 4 The court repeated its previous statement that
a labor union exceeds its lawful rights when it seeks to dictate marketing
hours, which is a proprietary function.2 0 5 That this finding is irrelevant has
been discussed at length.
20 6
In the court of appeals remand opinion20 7 it was stated that the setting
of marketing hours was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act 20 8 but was
to be judged by the trial court in light of the "rule of reason," 20 9 to see if the
restraint was unreasonable. Although the district court found that the re-
straint was reasonable, 210 the court of appeals, on the same evidence, deter-
mined the restraint to be unreasonable n.2 1 The court of appeals then reversed
the district court's finding that a conspiracy did not exist between the
grocers' association, its secretary and treasurer, and the union, by stating:
203. Id. at 846, 848. However, in holding that the union was pursuing a genuine
labor objection, the court cited Mr. Justice Black's Allen Bradley opinion as saying:
The court held that although the union benefitted by higher wages from the
plan, this was no mere labor dispute, but rather a combination to monopolize
trade, control its price, and discriminate between customers in violation of the
Sherman Act.
Id. at 847. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Justice Black did say in Allen Bradley:
It has been argued that no labor disputes existed. The argument is untenable.
We do not have here . . . a dispute between groups of business men revolving
solely around the price at which one group would sell commodities to another
group. On the contrary, Local No. 3 is a labor union and its spur to action
related to wages and working conditions.
325 U.S. 807 n.12.
204. Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc., 1964 Trade
Cas. 79328 (7th Cir. 1964).
205. Id. at 79330.
206. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
207. 274 F.2d 217 (1960).
208. Id. at 223. A per se violation is a substantive rule having evidentiary conse-
quences whereby certain obvious anticompetitive practices, such as price fixing, market
allocation and group boycotts cannot be defended against on the ground that they are
reasonable. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939) ; United
States v. Trenton Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) ; NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF
THE U.S.A. 21 (1960).
209. Those practices which are only illegal if they result in an unreasonable restraint
of trade. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1955);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
210. 215 F. Supp. at 848, 849.
211. Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc., 1964
Trade Cas. 79328, 79331 (7th Cir. 1964).
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In view of the facts in this case as shown by the evidence, it is clear
that plaintiff proved that the unions, Associated Food Retailers and
Bromann, its secretary, entered into a combination or agreement,
which constituted a conspiracy, as charged in the complaint. It was
therefore illegal and void because violative of the Sherman Act.2 1
2
The difficulty with the opinion of the court of appeals is that it did not
adhere to the Allen Bradley doctrine.218 The plaintiff's complaint properly
alleged a management antitrust violation and union participation therein,
2 14
but the court maintained that a conspiracy between the grocers' association
and the union was sufficient- to find a violation, apparently without a specific
finding of a management conspiracy.
215
Instead of applying Allen Bradley, the court of appeals incorrectly applied
the case of Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. United States.216 In Interstate Circuit
and agreement was inferred from an unrebutted invitation to participate in a
scheme among competitors.2 17 The court of appeals, applying the Interstate
Circuit doctrine to this case, said:
The district court in the case at bar found that "from 1957
plaintiff sought exclusion of the restriction on night sales from the
industry-wide contract, and the Defendant Local Unions resisted
such exclusion. The rest of the industry agreed with the Defendant
Local Unions to continue the ban on night operations.
218
It is submitted that although the retail grocers in Chicago, including super-
markets, accepted the union's proposal in a collective bargaining agreement,
proof that a conspiracy existed among the retail grocers was lacking. A
multi-employer bargaining agreement is not indicative in and of itself of a con-
212. Ibid.
213. (1) Is there an employer violation of the Sherman Act apart from consider-
ation of union activity and (2) did the union aid and abet the activities constituting the
violation by its participation therein.
214. (4) that defendant members of the Associated Food Retailers agreed
among themselves to insist that all collective bargaining agreements between
them and defendant union, or between defendant union and plaintiff or other
operators, contain the prohibition of retail sales of fresh meats outside these
hours; (5) that Associated conspired and agreed with other defendants that
neither plaintiff nor any other merchandiser is to be permitted to compete with
them by operating self-service meat markets between 6 P.M. and 9 A.M.; (6)
that defendant unions have acted as the enforcing agent of the conspiracy.
1959 Trade Cas. at 75227.
215. The association actually proposed night work in a collective bargaining session.
215 F. Supp. at 843, 845.
216. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
217. Id. at 226, 227. The Court inferred a conspiracy from individual agreements to
participate in a scheme with knowledge that competitors were agreeing to the same plan,
where no explanation was offered other than concert of action to explain the unanimity
of action.
21& Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc., 1964
Trade Cas. at 79330.
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spiracy,219 without proof, direct or circumstantial, of a common design220
on the part of management to achieve a restraint interdicted by the Sherman
Act.2 2 1 The court of appeals in Jewel Tea erroneously substituted its opinion
of what a genuine labor objective should constitute for a common scheme or
plan on the part of retail grocers, when, in fact, the district court expressly
negatived any unity of purpose or common scheme.222 The evidence in Jewel
Tea did not support the contention that a conspiracy existed on the part of
the retail grocers' association to prevent the plaintiff from selling meat
products after 6 P.M. and before 9 P.M. in which labor participated, 223 and
the court of appeals apparently did not require the existence of any such
evidence.
CONCLUSION
This Article has created a foundation for the application of the antitrust
laws to union activities. However, there has been a paucity of case law to
complete the framework of this foundation. The Article has shown that the
antitrust laws have not been applied to labor activities when a union acts
alone, i.e., not in combination with non-labor groups, even though such activi-
ties involve a direct or indirect commercial restraint. Additionally, it has
indicated that the antitrust laws have been applied to union activity when
a labor union participates in a management violation of the antitrust laws,
and when there is a conspiracy within the purview of the antitrust laws be-
tween two non-labor groups, one.of the conspirators not being a labor union
in contemplation of law.
Although additional legislation may be necessary to quell direct com-
mercial restraint imposed by union activity when labor unions act alone and
not in combination with non-labor groups, any such legislation, it is sub-
mitted, should not be supplementary to existing antitrust law, but instead,
should amend the NLRA.
While it is recommended that there be no legislative amendments to
the antitrust laws in their proper application to labor union activity, this is
not to suggest that all areas within this framework are clearly defined. Fore-
most among these uncharted regions is the type of circumstantial evidence
required to infer a conspiracy and, the nature of per se and rule of reason
219. In 1947, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947), but the conference rejected H.R. REP. No. 510. 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, 59
(1947). This report contained amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, outlawing industry-
wide bargaining. See note 175 supra.
220. Conspirators must have a common design or a unity of purpose. See e.g.,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213, 214 (1950).
221. Allen Bradley v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. at 809.
222. See note 215 supra.
223. Ibid.
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violations of the antitrust laws, as applied to labor union activity. These
questions frequently plagued the antitrust bar even without the added complex-
ity of the intervention of the labor law. It is submitted, however, that they
can be resolved with the advent of competent litigation in his area.
